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It is now very common in the literature on reasons and rationality to distinguish between
normative and motivating reasons. The former are, to a first approximation, facts which
count in favour of the agent performing certain actions or adopting certain attitudes. The
latter are, to a first approximation, the reasons for which the agent acts or maintains the
relevant attitude.1 That there is a distinction worth marking here is difficult to question,
if only because the fact that p might be a normative reason for one to φ even if the reason
for which one φs is not that p.2
A debate which has long vexed philosophers is that over Psychologism: the debate
over whether our motivating reasons should be identified with certain causally operative
psychological states. What, exactly, is at stake in this debate? Isn’t the debate merely
over what terms like ‘the reason’ refer to in ascriptions like ‘S φs for the reason that p’?
And why should that be a philosophically interesting debate? The answer isn’t obvi-
ous, which is surprising given all the attention this debate has garnered since Davidson
(1963) triggered it. In fact, this constitutes a puzzle: surely this debate is substantive,
and yet on the face of it it’s merely verbal.
A similar puzzle arises concerning a slightly younger debate which has vexed an
overlapping set of philosophers: the debate over Factivism – the debate, roughly speak-
ing, over whether S can φ for the reason that p even if not-p. Again, isn’t this a merely
1The distinction is drawn, in the case of practical reason, by: Parfit (1997); Dancy (2000); Olson and
Svensson (2005); Hieronymi (2011); Sandis (2013); Mantel (2013, 2014, 2015); and Fogal (2017, 2018);
in the case of epistemic reason by: Turri (2009); and in both domains at once by Singh (2019). See the
appendix of Dancy (2000: ch.1) for a brief history of the distinction.
2Throughout, ‘φ’ is used as a variable for any verb of action or mental attitude of a kind which can count
as a response to reasons. It might be strained to talk about motivating reasons in the case of attitudes
(compare Fogal (2018: 202-3)). It might be better in that context to talk of the reasons that are operative
with respect to the agent’s intention, belief, wish, desire, or whatever (indeed, Scanlon (1998) calls
motivating reasons in general ‘operative reasons’). Having noted this, and to avoid complication, I will
continue to use the terminology of motivating reasons for φ-ings generally.
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verbal debate over what phrases like ‘for the reason’ refer to inmotivating reasons ascrip-
tions? And why should we find that debate particularly interesting? The answer isn’t
easy to determine, and here we find a second puzzle, analogous to the first: surely there
must be some substantive issue here, but what?
This paper aims to do three things, the first of which is to motivate the two puzzles
just sketched. §1 focuses on the debate over Psychologism: I outline the debate; elu-
cidate what it is for a debate to be verbal; and make a prima facie case for thinking that
the debate is merely verbal. This raises a puzzle, for charity requires us to think that
there is something substantive afoot in this debate. §2 motivates the analogous puzzle
concerning Factivism.
The paper then attempts to solve these two puzzles by identifying substantive theses
in the area. I argue that given certain natural ways of motivating Psychologism and
Anti-Factivism, the proponents of those positions are committed to different versions
of a substantive view of the normative structure of rationality which I call the Anaemic
View. Identifying these substantive theses is the task of §3.
Finally, §4 aims to show that the substantive theses with which I associate Psycho-
logism and Anti-Factivism are false, on the grounds that they falsify the deliberative
phenomenology and ethical dimension of being a rational agent. Thus, my overall mes-
sage to proponents of Psychologism and Anti-Factivism is this: your theories can be
saved from the charge of being merely verbal, but only at the expense of incurring a
commitment to false substantive theses about rationality.
1 Psychologism: A Puzzle
In this section I’ll outline the debate over Psychologism (§1.1). I’ll then specify a frame-
work, largely borrowed from Chalmers (2011), for understanding verbal disputes (§1.2).
Finally, I’ll motivate my puzzle by showing that the debate is prima facie verbal (§1.3).
1.1 Psychologism vs. Anti-Psychologism
According to Psychologism motivating reasons are to be identified with certain non-
factive psychological states the agent is in, which ground their treating p as a normative
reason for them to φ and which cause their φ-ing.3 Typically, in the case of action and
practical attitudes the psychological states in question are identified with a suitably re-
lated belief/pro-attitude pair. And typically, in the case of doxastic attitudes the relevant
3A state of mind with propositional content is factive just in case one could be in it only if the relevant
proposition is true. Otherwise, it’s non-factive.
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states are identified with a set of suitably related beliefs.4
According to Anti-Psychologism motivating reasons should be identified instead
with what is treated as a normative reason to φ by the agent – items which are poised to
play a certain role in the agent’s deliberation about whether to φ. What is treated as a
normative reason to φ by the agent might in turn get identified with a Fregean propos-
ition: a truth evaluable item individuated at the level of Fregean sense, or alternatively
with a state of affairs: an item individuated at the level of Fregean reference to which
Fregean propositions are supposed, in some sense, to correspond. In order to avoid
taking a stand on this issue I will say that Anti-Psychologism identifies motivating reas-
ons with considerations treated as normative reasons by agents – whatever those are.
The relevant psychological states are then treated by the Anti-Psychologist as condi-
tions which enable the consideration to play the role of the agent’s motivating reason,
not as constituting that reason.5
Suppose Cassidy promises to meet an acquaintance for dinner tomorrow evening.
She doesn’t really have the inclination, but she intends to go anyway, because she prom-
ised. Cassidy treats the consideration that she promised as a normative reason for her
to intend to go. What grounds her doing so, and also what cause her intention, is cer-
tain psychological states she’s in: her belief that she promised plus, we can take it, a
pro-attitude towards acts of promise-keeping. According to Psychologism, Cassidy’s
motivating reason for her intention should be identified with the states of mind just
mentioned. According to Anti-Psychologism, it should be identified with the consider-
ation treated by Cassidy as a normative reason: that I promised, where Cassidy’s belief
and pro-attitude function merely to enable that consideration to function as Cassidy’s
motivating reason.
What gets treated as a normative reason to φ by the agent is typically some consid-
eration about the way the world is, as in the example just given. The Anti-Psychologist
will thus typically identify motivating reasons with worldly considerations, whereas the
Psychologist will typically treat them as first-order psychological states directed towards
the relevant worldly considerations. But on occasion, what gets treated as a normative
reason by the agent is a consideration concerning their own mind. For example, a re-
ligious ascetic might treat the consideration that they have a certain sexual desire as a
normative reason to engage in self-punitive behaviour, and indeed engage in that beha-
viour for the reason that they have that sexual desire. Psychologism would say that we
should identify the ascetic’s motivating reason with certain second-order states of mind
4Psychologism is supposedly endorsed by Davidson (1963), but more explicitly endorsed by Smith
(1987); Wallace (2003); Pryor (2007); and, in the epistemic case, Turri (2009).
5See footnotes 10 and 11 for a list of philosophers who endorse Anti-Psychologism.
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they are in: a belief that they have a certain sexual desire, plus a second-order desire
not to have such desires, say. Anti-Psychologism would say that we should identify the
ascetic’s motivating reason with the psychological consideration that they have a certain
sexual desire.6
1.2 What is a Verbal Dispute?
Is the debate over Psychologism a verbal dispute? We first need to know what it is for
a dispute to be verbal. Take an example. Suppose Ted, a Conservative, says: ‘marriage
is between a male and a female’ and Matt, a liberal, disagrees by saying: ‘marriage can
be between two members of the same sex’. But suppose further that Ted and Matt agree
full-well that the law should treat same-sex relationships just the same as heterosexual
relationships; that same-sex relationships are in no sensemorally inferior to heterosexual
ones; that our cultural norms should shift to reflect these moral truths. . . and so on. In
that case, one would have the impression that Ted and Matt aren’t really disagreeing
about anything substantial but are merely disagreeing about what the word ‘marriage’
means: Ted thinks it picks out one kind of relation; Matt thinks it picks out another –
and that’s it.
We have a rough idea of what a verbal dispute is. Now let’s sharpen it. Here’s
Chalmers’s (2011) characterisation:7
Intuitively, a dispute between two parties is verbal when the two parties
agree on the relevant facts about the domain of concern, and just disagree
about the language used to describe that domain. In such a case, one has the
sense that the two parties are “not really disagreeing”: that is, they are not
really disagreeing about the domain of concern, and are only disagreeing
over linguistic matters. (Chalmers, 2011: 515)
More precisely:
A dispute over S is. . . verbal when, for some expression T in S, the parties
disagree about the meaning of T, and the dispute over S arises wholly in
virtue of this disagreement. . . (Ibid.: 522)
The debate between Ted and Matt fits Chalmers’s characterisation: their dispute
arises solely because of the a disagreement over the meaning of ‘marriage’.
6For similar examples see Hyman (1999: 444), Dancy (2000: 125), and Alvarez (2010: 48).
7Although I uncritically take-over Chalmers’s view of verbal disputes, I am confident that the ensuing
argument would be unaffected were a distinct view operated with. For a critique of Chalmers’s position,
see Vermeulen (2018).
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How are we to go about determining whether a given debate is verbal? Chalmers
offers a plausible method for testing whether a dispute is verbal – the ‘Method of Elim-
ination’:
To apply this method to a dispute over a sentence S that is potentially verbal
with respect to term T, one proceeds as follows. First: one bars the use
of term T. Second: one tries to find a sentence S’ in the newly restricted
vocabulary such that the parties disagree non-verbally over S’ and such that
the disagreement over S’ is part of the dispute over S. . . If there is no such
S’, then the dispute over S is wholly verbal. . . (Chalmers, 2011: 526-527)
Applied to Ted and Matt, the idea would be this: if we ban the word ‘marriage’ can
we re-formulate the disagreement between them so that it comes out as substantive? It
looks like we can’t: if the debate is substantive then it would presumably concern some
ethical feature possessed by heterosexual relations which is supposedly lacked by same-
sex relations. But, banning the word ‘marriage’, we cannot formulate a sentence which
captures such an idea, about which Ted and Matt disagree.
1.3 Is the Debate Over Psychologism a Verbal Dispute?
Is the dispute over Psychologism merely verbal? We ascribe motivating reasons to
agents using a range of expressions. Here are some paradigms:
(1) S φs for the reason that p
(2) The reason for which S φs is that p
(3) S’s reason for φ-ing is that p
Psychologists andAnti-Psychologists disagree about what the terms ‘the reason’/‘S’s
reason’ mean in these contexts. Psychologists think that such terms refer to certain psy-
chological states of the agent; Anti-Psychologists think that they refer to what the agent
treats as a normative reason. But does this debate arise solely because of this linguistic
disagreement? If so, the debate is merely verbal.
Let’s apply Chalmers’s Method of Elimination. First, we ban ‘the reason’ and ‘S’s
reason’. We now need to find a sentence in which those terms don’t appear but which
expresses a substantive thesis about which the two parties disagree. It’s hard to find such
a sentence.
The most obvious suggestion is that the parties are in substantive disagreement over
the nature of the psychological states the agent counts as being in insofar as (1)–(3) is
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true of them. On this suggestion, the Psychologist thinks that the truth of (1), for ex-
ample, involves the agent being in a certain kind of psychological state, whereas the
Ant-Psychologist denies this. On the assumption that we could characterise this type
of state without using our banned terms, we’d have isolated the desired substantive dis-
agreement.
But this suggestion cannot be right. After all, the following is accepted by both
parties:
Distinctionψ Insofar as the agentφs for the reason that p, we should distinguish between:
(i) the psychological states which are causally operative with respect to the agent’s
φ-ing and which ground their treating p as a normative reason for them to φ; and
(ii) what the agent treats as a normative reason for them to φ, namely: p – some-
thing which plays a certain role in their first-person deliberation about whether to
φ.
Thus, both Psychologists and Anti-Psychologists agree that when (1) is true, the
agent has the following psychological properties: they treat p as a normative reason
for them to φ; they are in certain psychological states which ground them treating p in
that way; these states cause their φ-ing. But if they agree full-well on that, they agree
full-well on what the salient psychological facts are. So there can be no substantive
disagreement between them about the nature of the psychological states which underpin
(1)–(3).
An alternative suggestion is that Psychologists and Ant-Psychologists disagree on
something explanatory. On this suggestion, the Psychologist says that what grounds the
truth of (1) is a state of affairs which enables us to explain why the agent φs by appeal
to their non-factive states: S φs because S believes that p. The Anti-Psychologist, by
contrast, would say that the state of affairs which grounds (1) enables us to rationalise
S’s φ-ing both in terms their non-factive states and in terms of the fact that p itself: ‘S
φs because p’. Since we’ve specified these explanations without using ‘the reason’ and
‘S’s reason’, we have a candidate substantive disagreement.
But this can’t be right either. For one thing, not all Anti-Psychologists agree that
if (1) is true of an agent, we can rationalise their action in terms of the fact that p –
Anti-Factivists deny precisely that, as we’ll see. So this can’t be the correct way of
characterising the debate between the two parties. Also: it’s not obvious that we have
in fact succeeded in characterising a debate without using our banned terms – after all,
what makes a rationalising explanation rationalising is that it’s one which specifies the
agent’s reasons in φ-ing.
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Since these are apparently the only options for reconstructing a substantive debate
here, we should conclude that the debate over Psychologism is, apparently, merely
verbal: it arises solely because of a disagreement about what ‘the reason’ and ‘S’s
reason’ mean in (1)–(3). Such a debate is of little interest to philosophers aiming to the-
orise about the role of reasons in our mental lives. Those with that interest could simply
draw Distinctionψ; introduce technical terms to refer to each term of the distinction – for
example, ‘primary reasons’ and ‘deliberative reasons’ to refer to (i) and (ii) respectively;
and thence carry out their theoretical aims, making use of the technical vocabulary as
necessary, whilst remaining neutral on the linguistic dispute concerning whether our
ordinary motivating reasons ascriptions pick out (i) or (ii), or are polysemous.8
But this gives rise to a puzzle. It would be very uncharitable to interpret the philo-
sophers who’ve engaged in this long dispute as engaging in a mere back-and-forth about
linguistic matters. This means our default view should be that there is some substance
to this dispute somewhere: at least one of the parties to it is intending to defend a sub-
stantive thesis. But what? I return to this question in §3.
2 Factivism: A Puzzle
I now want to turn my attention to a second debate about motivating reasons: the debate
over Factivism. I outline the debate in §2.1 and then make a case for thinking that it’s
merely verbal in §2.2.
2.1 Factivism vs. Anti-Factivism
The debate over Factivism is premised on the truth of Anti-Psychologism: both the Fact-
ivist and Anti-Factivist are essentially committed to the claim that motivating reasons
are the considerations one treats as normative reasons for one to φ, typically consider-
ations concerning the way the world is. Factivism combines Anti-Psychologism with
the view that S φs for the reason that p only if p is the case.9 Anti-Factivism combines
Anti-Psychologism with the view that one can φ for the reason that p even if not-p.
Here’s an example. My flight to Edinburgh is due to leave at noon and, looking at
my watch, I see that I only have fifteen minutes to get to the terminal. I start running,
and I do so for the reason that I only have fifteen minutes until my flight leaves. My
8Although they are not entirely explicit, I think Olson and Svensson (2005); Hieronymi (2011); Mantel
(2015); and Fogal (2018) treat the debate over Psychologism as verbal because they take Distinctionψ to
be accepted by everyone and, once accepted, the debate over Psychologism to be settled for philosophical
purposes simply by distinguishing different senses of ‘reason’.
9This matches the formulation of Alvarez (2010, 2018).
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reason here is identified with the consideration: I only have fifteen minutes until my
flight leaves, and not any psychological state(s) I am in. But now suppose I’m mistaken:
suppose I’ve misread my watch and, in fact, I have an entire hour until my flight leaves.
Do I still count as running to the terminal for the reason that I only have fifteen minutes
until my flight leaves? Factivists say no.10 Anti-Factivists say yes.11
It’ll be helpful to express the difference between the two views in the following
way. Let’s call good cases cases in which the agent φs motivated by a fact they treat as a
normative reason for them to φ, and cases of factual error cases in which the agent φs on
the false belief that some consideration obtains, which seems to them to be a normative
reason for them to φ. The agent in the latter situation cannot tell, just by reflection,
that they are not in a good case, but their belief in their reason is false nevertheless.
The Factivist says that S φs for the reason that p only if they are in the good case. The
Anti-Factivist says that S φs for the reason that p in good cases and cases of factual
error.
2.2 Is the Debate Over Factivism a Verbal Dispute?
Is the dispute over Factivism merely verbal? It’s obvious that there are semantic dis-
agreements between the Factivist and Anti-Factivist. Consider again:
(1) S φs for the reason that p
(2) The reason for which S φs is that p
(3) S’s reason for φ-ing is that p
The Anti-Factivist will want to say that each of (1)–(3) can be true even if p is false
and the Factivist denies this. The Factivist might want to say, for example, that ‘for the
reason’ in (1) or ‘the reason for which’ in (2) or ‘S’s reason’ in (3) are phrases which
are factive: it’s built-into their meaning that the sentences in which they’re embedded
require p to be true. The Anti-Factivist will want to deny all of that. Our question is:
does the dispute over Factivism arise merely because of this linguistic dispute? If so,
the debate is verbal.
Let’s apply Chalmers’s Method of Elimination. First, we ban the phrases ‘for the
reason’, ‘the reason for which’, and ‘S’s reason’. Next, we go on the search for a sentence
10Factivism, so-understood, is endorsed by Hyman (1999, 2010, 2015); Bittner (2001); Stout (2009);
Alvarez (2010, 2018); Raz (2011a); Littlejohn (2012); and Roessler (2014), amongst others.
11Anti-Factivism, so-understood, is endorsed by Parfit (1997); Dancy (2000, 2003, 2011); Miller (2008);
Schroeder (2008); Setiya (2011); Marcus (2012); Comesaña and McGrath (2014); and Singh (2019),
amongst others.
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expressing a substantive thesis, in which those phrases don’t appear, and about which
our two parties disagree. Again, it’s hard to find such a sentence.
It seems that if there is a substantive disagreement in this area, that’ll be because the
Anti-Factivist wants to say that there’s some philosophically interesting condition which
obtains across both good cases and cases of factual error, whereas the Factivist wants to
say instead that this condition obtains only in good cases. If we could characterise this
condition without using our banned phrases, we’d have got what we want.
But this suggestion can’t be right because the following is accepted by everyone:
Distinctionf We should distinguish between (i) there being a fact, treated by the agent
as a normative reason to φ, which the agent φs in the light of; and (ii) S φ-ing
in a way that manifests a belief in something they treat as a normative reason for
them to φ. (i) obtains only in the good case; (ii) obtains across both good cases
and cases of factual error.
Both Factivists and Anti-Factivists agree that only when the agent is in the good case
do they count as φ-ing in the light of a fact. And both agree that across both good cases
and cases of factual error, they φ because of what appears to them to be a normative
reason for them to φ. But if both agree about this, they both agree on what conditions
obtain just in good cases and what are neutral across good cases and cases of factual
error. And if that’s so, it appears that the only disagreement left between them is the
mere verbal disagreement about the truth-conditions of (1)–(3).
Again, such a verbal debate appears to be of little interest to philosophers aiming to
theorise about the role of reasons in our mental lives. That’s because philosophers with
that interest could simply draw Distinctionf ; introduce technical terms to refer to each
term of the distinction – for example: ‘being motivated by a fact’ and ‘being motivated
by a belief’ for (i) and (ii) respectively; and thence carry out their theoretical aims,
making use of the technical vocabulary as necessary, whilst remaining neutral on the
linguistic dispute concerning whether our ordinary motivating reasons ascriptions pick
out (i) or (ii), or are polysemous.12
But this gives rise to a second puzzle, analogous to the first: surely there is something
philosophically important afoot here – it’d be very uncharitable to read the relevant
philosophers as merely engaged in debate about the meanings of certain English words.
Our default assumption should therefore be that there is at least some substantive thesis
in the vicinity of at least one of the parties to the debate. But what is it? It takes work
to answer this, to which I now turn.
12In suggesting that we can avoid the Factivism debate by distinguishing a factive from a non-factive use
of motivating reasons ascriptions Locke (2015) effectively treats the debate as verbal.
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3 The Anaemic View of Rationality
We have two puzzles on our hands. The debates over Psychologism and Factivism look
very much like merely verbal disputes, but our default assumption should be that there
is at least some substantive thesis in the vicinity. This section solves the puzzles by
identifying certain substantive theses about the normative structure of rationality – dif-
ferent versions of the Anaemic View of rationality – in the vicinity of Psychologism
and Anti-Factivism. §3.1 explains the Anaemic View; §3.2 distinguishes two version
of it; §3.3 justifies the claims that Psychologism can be associated with one version,
Anti-Factivism the other.
3.1 What the Anaemic View Is
We judge agents rational and irrational – these are certain kinds of positive and negative
appraisal. Following Comesaña and McGrath (2014: 61), we can distinguish ex ante
rationality from ex post rationality. φ-ing is ex ante rational for an agent just if φ-ing
is a rational thing for them to do, whether or not they actually do it. φ-ing is ex post
rational for an agent just if they φ in a way that warrants praise as rational. This distinc-
tion is analogous to the epistemologist’s distinction between propositional and doxastic
justification. Our focus in the remainder is ex post rationality – this is what ‘rationality’
will refer to.
The Anaemic View says that φ-ing rationally consists in φ-ing correctly in response
to an ought of rationality, but where this status, in turn, is to be thought of as super-
vening on one’s non-factive psychological states. We are to conceive rationality as a
status which is insulated from one’s external environment. But we’re also to think of
it as a matter of φ-ing motivated by a rational ought. So: there’s a way of successfully
responding to a certain kind of obligation one is under which is available to one no mat-
ter what one’s environment is like, and it’s this sort of response which is constitutive of
rationality properly so-called.
More precisely, the Anaemic View is the conjunction of:
Normativive-Guidance. Necessarily, S φs rationally iff (i) S rationally ought to φ; and
(ii) S’s φ-ing is a response to what makes it the case that they rationally ought to
φ.13
13If this principle is to be plausible it will have to allow that agents can φ rationally even when they are
merely rationally permitted to φ. Normative-Guidance can be easily reformulated to allow for this:
that would just be a matter of adding disjuncts to clauses (i) and (ii), so as to cover the case of rational
permission. Moreover, certain aspects of the remainder of the paper would also be reformulated so as
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Psychological-Narrowness. Necessarily, for any two individuals, S and S*, and for any
type of φ-ing both S and S* are engaged in: if S and S* are in the same non-factive
psychological states then S and S* are exactly alike with respect to whether they
φ rationally.
Normative-Guidance expresses a kind of deontic view of the nature of rationality. It
says that when one φs rationally, one ought to φ, from the rational point of view. One’s
being subject to this ought will be grounded in certain factors, and we are to conceive of
φ-ing rationally as φ-ing guided or directed or motivated by these factors. These terms
are vague. But they should serve to provide at least a preliminary indication of what the
proponent of Normative-Guidance has in mind: the intuitive idea is that rationally φ-ing
involves responding correctly to factors that rationally bind one to φ-ing. According to
Normative-Guidance, then, φ-ing rationality is a kind of normative achievement: it’s a
matter of φ-ing as one ought, where that is a status for which one deserves credit.
Psychological-Narrowness is simply the thesis that rationality is a narrowly super-
vening status: pairs of individuals who are both φ-ing and who are internal psycholo-
gical duplicates must also be exactly alike with respect to whether they count as φ-ing
rationally. No rational difference without a difference in non-factive states of mind.
Normative-Guidance and Psychological-Narrowness are logically separable: neither
entails the other. But if we put them together, the following picture emerges. By
Psychological-Narrowness, rationality is a status one enjoys just because of the way
things appear to one. But by Normative-Guidance that status consists in responding
correctly to an ought of rationality which applies to one. It follows that rational oughts
are oughts which apply to one regardless of how one’s environment is, and one is in a
position to successfully respond to them regardless of how one’s environment is, too.
I call the view the Anaemic View because it is a way of capturing Davidson’s well-
known remark that: ‘. . . there is a certain irreducible – though somewhat anaemic –
sense in which every rationalization justifies. . . ’ (Davidson, 1963: 9).
3.2 Two Versions of the Anaemic View
The Anaemic View is a highly abstract thesis: it just says that rationality is a matter of
responding correctly to oughts of rationality and that this is an environment-independent
to allow for rational permissions. Structuralism would have to be formulated so as to make room for
coherence principles governing what sets of attitudes are permissible; likewise subjectivism would have
to be reformulated to make room for the idea that there are subjective permissions as well as subjective
oughts; and the phenomenological argument of §4 would have to be supplemented with the plausible
thesis that it appears to the rational agent as if the only factors which determine what makes a sufficient
case for φ-ing are worldly facts. I do not have space to argue for this, but I think it’s prima facie plausible
that these modifications can successfully be made.
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status. In order to get a more concrete grip of what the view amounts to, we’d need to
know how oughts of rationality are to be conceived by the proponent of the view. Here
I’ll distinguish two answers to that question, corresponding to two different versions of
the Anaemic View.
According to Structuralism:
Structuralism about Rationality. The Anaemic View is true and oughts of rationality
are to be identified with so-called structural requirements of rationality.
Structural requirements of rationality place restrictions on what combinations of at-
titudes agents are to have. In particular, they function to ban sets of attitudes which are
jointly incoherent. They are most naturally stated in the form of material conditionals
which state that rationality requires the agent to hold some attitude (the consequent atti-
tude), if they hold some set of further attitudes (the antecedent attitudes). Here are two
examples of rational requirements for the practical and epistemic domains respectively:
Instrumental Requirement. Rationality requires S to intend to ψ, if she intends to φ
and believes ψ-ing to be necessary for φ-ing;
Modus Ponens Requirement. Rationality requires S to believe that q, if she believes
that p and believes that p→ q.
The Structuralist says that we should elaborate the Anaemic View in terms of struc-
tural requirements of rationality. On this view, when one rationally φs one is in certain
non-factive psychological states which ground a structural requirement of rationality
that applies to one – those states being the antecedent attitudes which appear in the
structural requirement.14 Rationality is then thought to consist in successfully respond-
ing to that structural requirement by being guided or motivated by the psychological
states which ground its application to one. These structural requirements apply to one
just by dint of the way things appear to one: they apply to one independently of the way
one’s environment is, and one’s being able to successfully φ guided by them is also an
ability one enjoys independently of one’s environment. Rationality is all about ensuring
coherence amongst one’s attitudes and actions, and the power to ensure that is something
one cannot lose just by dint of changes to one’s environment.
A different version of the Anaemic View is Subjectivism:
14Although Structuralism says that the application of a structural requirement to a given agent is grounded
in the agent having the relevant antecedent attitudes, this doesn’t mean that they will have to think of
structural requirements as having narrow scope, as Kiesewetter (2017: §3.3) points out.
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Subjectivism about Rationality. The Anaemic View is true and oughts of rationality
are to be identified with subjective oughts.
According to Subjectivism we’re to combine the Anaemic View with the thought
that the oughts of rationality are so-called subjective oughts. On this view, we should
distinguish between two kinds of ought: the objective ought, which is determined by
facts about one’s situation, and the subjective ought, which is determined by what one
believes about one’s situation. These are two fundamentally different kinds of normativ-
ity. On the one hand there is the familiar kind of normativity associated with normative
reasons – oughts which apply to one by dint of objective features of one’s situation. On
the other hand there is a subjective surrogate for that kind of normativity – oughts which
apply to one by dint of facts about what one believes about the situation, not by dint of
the way the situation is, objectively speaking.15 The two kinds of ought are independent,
but related: to a first approximation, the belief that p counts as grounding a subjective
ought that applies to the agent just when, and indeed because, it satisfies the following
counterfactual: were p true, it would be the case that S objectively ought to φ.16 Ration-
ality, as opposed to morality or prudence, say, concerns itself only with the latter sort of
ought.
Subjectivism has it that when one rationally φs, one has certain beliefs about one’s
environment which make it the case that one subjectively ought to φ. Rationality is then
to be thought of as consisting in successfully responding to such a subjective ought by
being guided by what one believes. Rationality is all about ensuring that the subject-
ive surrogates of bone fide normative reasons are successfully responded to, and one’s
ability to do so is one which cannot be lost just by changes to one’s environment.
3.3 Our Two Puzzles Solved
Let’s now return to the debates over Psychologism and Factivism. I argued earlier that
these debates look merely verbal. We’re now in a position to tease out the substantive
issues associated with each. In short, there’s a case for associating Psychologism with
Structuralism and a comparative case for associating Anti-Factivism with Subjectivism.
Since these are substantive theses about the normative structure of rationality, there are
substantive disputes in these areas, after all. Our two initial puzzles are thus solved.
15The modern origin of the notion of the subjective ought is Ewing (1953). Schroeder (2009) and Vogel-
stein (2012) defend and develop the closely related notion of a subjective reason and, although they are
not explicit about it, Comesaña and McGrath (2014) seem to me to be committed to the existence of
subjective reasons. See Dancy (1977) and Kiesewetter (2017: §2.3 & §4.3) for criticism of the notions
of subjective reason and subjective ought.
16Of course, this formulation of the counterfactual test is far too crude. See Schroeder (2009) and Vogel-
stein (2012) for refinements.
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Let’s start with Psychologism: the view that one’s motivating reasons are the psy-
chological states one is in which ground one’s treating p as a reason to φ and which cause
one’s φ-ing. Here’s a question I didn’t ask earlier: why should we endorse Psycholo-
gism? How should it be argued for? One natural strategy is to appeal to the intuitive idea
that agents in factual error cases count as φ-ing rationally. But if an agent φs rationally,
they must φ for a reason. So, agents in factual error cases count as φ-ing for a reason.
But what reason could that be? Whatever the agent’s reasons are, they must be things in
terms of which we can provide a rationalising explanation of why they φ and we can’t
appeal to what the agent believes in the factual error case to do that: after all, what they
believe is false. The only other option is to identify the agent’s reason in the factual error
case with the psychological states that cause their φ-ing and which ground their treating
p as a normative reason for them to φ. This gets us the result that Psychologism holds
in the factual error case. The further thought is then going to be that whatever holds of
the factual error case also holds of the good case: what motivates the agent doesn’t shift
across the two cases. And this takes us to the truth of Psychologism in general.
An analogous argument is available for Anti-Factivism: the view that motivating
reasons are what one believes about one’s situation, but that one can φmotivated by the
reason that p even if not-p. This argument proceeds to the claim that the agent in the
factual error case φs for a reason just as before: via the idea that they φ rationally and
that this involves φ-ing for a reason. The question again arises: what could that reason
be? At this point, the Anti-Factivist will deny that motivating reasons are the things in
terms of which we can provide rationalising explanations of why the agent φs. They’ll
instead say that motivating reasons play a deliberative role: they are the things which
the agent treats as favouring their φ-ing in episodes of deliberation which lead to the
conclusion to φ. The agent’s motivating reason in the factual error case is therefore to
be identified with what the agent (erroneously) believes about their situation – not with
any psychological state they are in. But since all this holdsmutatis mutandis for the good
case, it must be that in general the agent’s motivating reasons are to be identified with
what they believe about their situation, where such things can play the role of motivating
the agent whether or not they are true – and this is just Anti-Factivism.17
These arguments have a common structure. They each start by showing that the agent
in the factual error case φs for a reason. They then appeal to different principles about
what motivating reasons are (an explanatory principle in the case of Psychologism; a
deliberative principle in the case of Anti-Factivism) to get us the result that the favoured
theory is true of the factual error case. There is then a ‘spreading step’ which enables
us to generalise that conclusion to good cases.
17See Schroeder (2008) and Comesaña and McGrath (2014) for arguments of this character.
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I now want to show that if the proponents of Psychologism and Anti-Factivism mo-
tivate their positions in these ways, they’ll have to commit to Structuralism and Subject-
ivism, respectively. Since these are substantive theses about rationality, if this sugges-
tion is right we’ll have succeeded in isolating substantive theses in the vicinity of the
two disputes we started out with after all.
Each argument shares a key premise: if the agent φs rationally, they φ for a reason.
Why should we think this? Why not say, instead, that if S φs rationally then S φs in a way
that is positively evaluable – for example, that S’s φ-ing manifests the virtue of ration-
ality,18 or that S’s φ-ing manifests their functioning properly as a rational agent?19 Each
of these evaluative conceptions of rationality is consistent with denying that rationality
involves being motivated by a reason, it seems. Opponents of the two ‘arguments from
factual error’ could, it seems, perfectly well say that the agent in the factual error case
manifests proper functioning as a rational agent; manifests the virtue of rationality; and
that they φ in response to amerely apparent reason, whilst denying that the agent counts
as φ-ing for a reason simpliciter. What would be incoherent about that suggestion?
In order to resist this move, the proponent of the idea that φ-ing rationally involves
φ-ing for a reason is going to have to reject the evaluative conception of rationality just
broached. But if they deny an evaluative view, how are they to account for the positive
status they want to ascribe to the agent in the factual error case and which they label
‘rationality’? The only further option is to view rationality along the lines of normative-
guidance: they’ll have to say that rationality consists in φ-ing guided by a factor which
makes it the case that one rationally ought to φ. They’ll then account for what’s going on
in the factual error case by saying that the agent in it is subject to an ought of rationality,
and they count as φ-ing rationally because they count as correctly φ-ing in response to
that ought.
But Normative-Guidance only gets us to the idea that φ-ing rationally involves φ-ing
for a reason if the following principle is true:
MR-Ought. Necessarily, if S φs rationally and this consists in their φ-ing in response to
a factor whichmakes it the case that they rationally ought to φ, then S φs motivated
by a reason which is to be identified with that factor.
According toMR-Ought, if we’re tomodel rationality in terms ofNormative-Guidance,
we’ll have to say that rational agents φ for reasons, and these are just the things which
18For defences of the virtue-theoretic view of rationality, see Dancy (2009) and Svavarsdóttir (2006,
2008). For criticism, see Kolodny (2005: 553–555) and Kiesewetter (2017: §2.5).
19For the proper-functioning theory of rationality, see Raz (2005, 2011b). See Kiesewetter (2017: §2.4)
for criticism.
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ground the ought to which the agent counts as successfully responding. Only if one
commits to this idea in conjunction with Normative-Guidance will one be able to de-
fend the premise that φ-ing rationally requires φ-ing for a reason, against the attack from
the evaluative view of rationality described above.
What this means is that the proponents of Psychologism and Anti-Factivism who
motivate their positions in the above ways will have to commit themselves to Normative-
Guidance and to MR-Ought. But if they do this, they end up committed in turn to one of
the versions of the Anaemic View described above: the Psychologist ends up committed
to Structuralism, the Anti-Factivist to Subjectivism. Let me explain.
Consider first Psychologism. What happenswhenwe combine Psychologism, Normative-
Guidance, and MR-Ought, as any proponent of Psychologism who motivates their posi-
tion by the above argument from factual error will have to? What we get is the following
claim about rationality: when the agent φs rationally, this consists in them φ-ing in re-
sponse to a factor which grounds an ought of rationality which applies to them, and
these factors are certain non-factive psychological states of the agent. On this view, ra-
tional oughts are grounded in what non-facive psychological states the agent is in, and
rationality consists in responding correctly to these oughts, guided by the non-factive
psychological states at issue. What sorts of rational oughts are grounded in the non-
factive psychological states of the agent? The only option here is to say that they are
oughts of structural rationality. So if the Psychologist motivates their position by appeal
to the above argument, they end up committed to Structuralism.
Notice that since the Anaemic View and Structuralism were characterised without
using the phrases ‘the reason’ and ‘S’s reason’, we’ve succeeded in isolating a sentence
– ‘The Anaemic View in its Structuralist Version is true’ – which we have a grip on
independently of the verbal disagreement between Psychologists andAnti-Psychologists
and which is surely substantive. Since I’ve shown that every Psychologist whomotivates
their position by appeal to the above argument from factual error is committed to the
truth of that sentence, I’ve therefore shown that there is a bona fide substantive thesis in
the vicinity of Psychologism: Structuralism. This solves the first puzzle.
Let me know try to show that the Anti-Factivist who motivates their position by ap-
peal to the analogous argument from the factual error thereby commits themselves to
the other version of the Anaemic View: Subjectivism. What happens when we com-
bine Anti-Factivism, Normative-Guidance, and MR-Ought, as any proponent of Anti-
Factivism who motivates their position via the argument from factual error needs to?
We get the following conception of rationality: rationally φ-ing consists in φ-ing in re-
sponse to factors which make it the case that one rationally ought to φ, and these factors
are to be identified with what the agent believes about their situation, as opposed to any
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psychological state they are in. On this view, rationality consists in φ-ing guided by
the way things appear from one’s perspective, so that one ends up φ-ing in accordance
with an ought that applies to one just by dint of things appearing to one in that way. But
what sorts of rational oughts are grounded in what one believes about the situation? The
only plausible answer here is: subjective oughts. So if the Anti-Factivist motivates their
position by appeal to the above argument, they end up committed to Subjectivism.
Again, the Anaemic View and Subjectivism were characterised without using the
phrases ‘for the reason’, ‘the reason for which’, and ‘S’s reason’. So we’ve succeeded in
isolating a sentence – ‘The Anaemic View in its Subjectivist Version is true’ – which we
grasp independently of the verbal disagreement between Factivists and Anti-Factivists
and which is surely substantive. I’ve shown that every Anti-Factivist who motivates
their position by appeal to the above argument from factual error is committed to the
truth of that sentence. So I’ve therefore shown that there is a bona fide substantive thesis
in the vicinity Anti-Factivism: Subjectivism. This solves the second puzzle.
4 The Perspective of Rationality
I’ve now isolated two substantive theses in the vicinity of Psychologism andAnti-Factivism.
Psychologists, at least who motivate their position by appeal to the argument from fac-
tual error, are committed to Structuralism about Rationality. Likewise, Anti-Factivists
who motivate their position in the analogous way are committed to Subjectivism about
Rationality.
I want to finish the paper by critically assessing these substantive positions about
the normative structure of rationality. In particular, I want to demonstrate that these
views falsify the phenomenology of rationality – they imply that the agent’s own per-
spective on their φ-ing, when they φ rationally, is in error. They also imply that rational
agency intrinsically involves something like Williams’s (1976) one-thought-too-many
syndrome. The overall upshot is that Psychologism and Anti-Factivism can be saved
from the charge of being merely verbal positions, but only at the cost of being commit-
ted to false substantive ones.
In §4.1 I argue for a phenomenological constraint on φ-ing rationally. In §4.2 I ar-
gue that neither Structuralism nor Subjectivism meet this phenomenological constraint
and raise the Williamsian worry, too. Finally, in §4.3 I offer, as a coda to the paper, a
brief critical discussion of how the availability of a certain kind of disjunctive view of
rationality might be thought to undermine the argument of the paper.
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4.1 Normative-Guidance, Rational Agency, and the First-Person Per-
spective
Earlier we encountered Normative-Guidance, a component of the Anaemic View:
Normativive-Guidance. Necessarily, S φs rationally iff (i) S rationally ought to φ; and
(ii) S’s φ-ing is a response to what makes it the case that they ought to φ.
I left it hanging what it is to φ in response to what makes it the case that one ought
to φ. I now want to argue that if Normative-Guidance is to be plausible, we will have to
introduce the following constraint on our understanding of this in response to relation:
Perspectival Constraint. Necessarily, S φs in response to an ought-making feature, in
the sense of ‘in response to’ pertinent to Normative-Guidance, only if the ought-
making feature figures as such from S’s first-person perspective.
According to the Perspectival Constraint, whatever grounds the normatively signi-
ficant factor which moves the agent to their rational response must be something which
is an aspect of the agent’s perspective on the world. Moreover, the factor must appear
as grounding an ought of rationality from that point of view. Let me clarify.
To say that the factor in question must be present from the agent’s own point of view
involves saying that the factor is the object of some intentional state the agent is in,
where the intentional state is of a kind which, to a first approximation, constitutes the
presentation of the factor to the agent. This latter caveat is intended to rule it out that the
relevant mental state is one with a world-to-mind direction of fit: it is intended to rule it
out that the state is a desire, wish, hope, emotion, or the like. But that leaves it open what
kind, or kinds, of states with the opposite direction of fit can play the role laid down by
the Perspectival Constraint, and there are competing views it is possible to have about
this. For example, one may wish to identify the relevant sort of intentional state with
a belief or knowledge of some truth which is, or correctly represents, the normatively
significant factor in question. More liberally, onemight wish to leave it open that sensory
experiences can play the role of constituting the right sort of presence to mind.20 We
needn’t take a stand on this issue: I will think of the Perspectival Constraint neutrally in
terms of the idea that responding to an ought-making feature requires one to be aware
of it.
The Perspectival Constraint doesn’t just require the rational agent’s awareness of the
rationally significant factor. It also requires that the factor must be present as rationally
20See Schroeder (2011) for a defence of a particularly weak version of this position. SeeMcDowell (1996)
and Brewer (1999, 2011) for defences of alternative versions of this view.
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significant to the agent – that the agent in some way registers or manifests sensitivity to
the ought-grounding status of the factor in question. Again, there are many ways cashing
this out, some of which are less plausible than others. For example, one might wish to
cash out this condition in doxastic terms: as the view that when the agent φs rationally,
they believe or know that the factor in question makes it the case that they ought to φ.
Alternatively, and in order to avoid over-intellectualising rationality, one might wish
to cash out the condition in dispositionalist terms: as the view that when the agent φs
rationally, this must manifest them correctly treating the factor they’re aware of as a
factor which grounds a rational ought which applies to them. This treating condition
will then be further identified with having a complex of dispositions towards the factor
in question, such as the disposition to use the factor as a premise in reasoning. And, in
the practical case at least, these dispositions might in turn be thought grounded in certain
non-cognitive states of the agent. Again, we needn’t take a stand on this issue: I will
think of the Perspectival Constrain neutrally in terms of the idea that responding to an
rational ought-making feature requires the feature to be registered as ought-making.21
The Perspectival Constraint requires the ought-grounding factors to be present as
such from the agent’s own point of view. This rules out brute externalist forms of ra-
tionality, which would classify agents who have no view about whether there is anything
to be said for their φ-ing as agents who φ rationally. For example, the Perspectival Con-
straint would rule out BonJour’s (1980) Norman, at least in BonJour’s fourth version of
his case, as believing rationally.
Why think the Perspectival Constraint plausible? I myself find the verdicts the Per-
spectival Constraint yields concerning brute externalist cases intuitive. But it’d be better
not to rest content with that thought, for it is unlikely to convince the opponent of the
Constraint – either they simply won’t share the intuition or they would argue that their
alternative is equally intuitive.22 What else can we say?
According to a venerable philosophical tradition, the exercise of rationality on the
subject’s part is essentially linked to their capacity for agency. In particular: if an agent
φs rationally, they must have the ability to engage in certain mental acts of conscious
reasoning, where these acts constitute them taking control of whether they φ, and in
response to what ought-making factor they do so (if any). I think this Agential View of
rationality is plausible.23 But if it’s plausibility is to be brought into focus, two clarific-
ations should be made.
21For debate over whether we should prefer the doxastic construal or the dispositional construal, see
Boghossian (2014), McHugh and Way (2016), and Sylvan (2015).
22Compare Srinivasan (2020).
23For differing versions of the Agential View, see McDowell (1996); Korsgaard (2009); and Boyle (2009,
2011). For criticism of the idea restricted to the epistemic case see Owens (2000) and Setiya (2013).
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First, we should distinguish between having the general ability to φ from having
the option to φ.24 Consider an agent who speaks German and contrast them with a
monolingual English speaker. There is a sense in which the former is able to speak
German and the latter isn’t: the former has the general ability to speak German but the
latter doesn’t. But now contrast the German speaker with another German speaker who
has had their lips glued together in a practical joke. Although both have the general
ability to speak German, there remains a sense in which the former, but not the latter,
is able to speak German. We can say that the former has the option to speak German
whereas the latter doesn’t. Intuitively: having the general ability to φ in a certain context
doesn’t require being able to successfully exercise this ability there-and-then, whereas
having the option to φ does. The Agential View of rationality should be understood
as saying that an agent φs rationally only if they have the general ability to engage in
certain acts of conscious reasoning. The Agential View therefore allows that an agent
φs rationally even though – through tiredness, a state of heightened emotion, a state of
ill mental health, or because they are unconscious – they aren’t in a position to engage
in control-through-conscious-reasoning of their φ-ing there-and-then.
Second, the sort of control at issue is direct. Consider an agent who successfully
gets themselves to drop their urge to smoke by engaging in an act of self-hypnosis, or
by ingesting a new wonder-drug which functions to suppress that urge. In these sorts
of cases, the agent has control over their urge just insofar as they are able to engage in
certain acts of self-manipulation. Contrast these cases with a case in which the agent
moves a limb or engages in an episode of imagination: in these sorts of cases, the agent
exerts control over their body or mind in an intuitively more direct manner. According to
the Agential View of rationality, φ-ing rationally requires possessing the general ability
to engage in an act of conscious reasoning which constitutes one’s taking direct control
over whether one φs and in response to what.25
This plausible Agential View of rationality requires the proponent of Normative-
Guidance to commit themselves to the Perspectival Constraint. For suppose that the
Agential View is true. Now take an agent who φs rationally and suppose further that
there is nothing from that agent’s perspective which counts as making it the case that
they ought to φ. Is that agent able to exert direct control over whether they φ through
conscious reasoning? I don’t see how they could: after all, there’s nothing for the episode
24My terminology follows Maier (2013).
25Since rational belief formation is involuntary, in order for this Agential View of rationality to apply
in the epistemic setting it must be the case that theoretical reasoning which concludes in a rational
change to one’s doxastic state must be a way of exercising genuinely direct agential control of what one
believes, but which isn’t voluntary. I’m happy to undertake this commitment: I think we do exercise
direct control of what we believe in theoretical reasoning, and that this control is involuntary. For a
defence of that idea see Hieronymi (2006, 2008, 2009) and McHugh (2010, 2014, 2015).
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of conscious reasoning in question to operate on. What this means is that if the Agential
View is true, and the agent φs rationally, there will have to be something within the
agent’s point of view which appears to them to count in favour of φ-ing and which
figures as premise in the episode of conscious deliberation they are able to engage in.
But now suppose, in addition, that Normative Guidance is true, so that the agent in
question counts as successfully responding to a factor that makes it the case that they
rationally ought to φ. What is the relationship between that factor and the factor which,
by the lights of the Agential View, figures as a premise in the episode of conscious
reasoning the agent is able to engage in? From the agent’s own point of view, these two
factors are the same. That is, from the agent’s own point of view, the factor(s) which
figure in the episode of conscious reasoning as favouring their φ-ing just are the factors
that make it rational for them to φ. So, on pain of endorsing an error theory of this
aspect of the agent’s perspective on themselves, anyone wishing to endorse both the
Agential View and Normative Guidance will have to say that it’s a necessary condition
of the agent φ-ing rationally that the factor which makes it the case that they rationally
ought to φ figures as such from their own point of view. But that’s just the Perspectival
Constraint.
4.2 The Mental Life of the Rational Agent
Neither Structuralism nor Subjectivismmeet the Perspectival Constraint. For that reason,
they should be rejected. And for that reason, neither Psychologism nor Anti-Factivism,
motivated in the ways described in §3.3, can be associated with plausible substantive
theses.
Let’s take Structuralism first. According to the Structuralist, rationality consists in φ-
ing in a way that counts as a successful response to a structural requirement of rationality
which applies to one. The idea is that if one is in certain non-factive psychological states,
that imposes a requirement on one that one acts in certain ways, or holds certain other
states, on pain of incoherence. Rationality is achieved when one is in certain non-factive
states which impose such a requirement on one to φ, and one φs in response to these
states, so that one counts as discharging one’s structural obligation.
Since the ‘in response to’ relation is subject to the Perspectival Constraint, what
the proponent of Structuralism will have to say, further, is this: whenever the agent φs
rationally, they must be aware of certain of their non-factive psychological states which
are in turn registered by them to make it the case that they structurally ought to φ.
But the basic phenomenological objection to this idea is that it is not the case, in
general, that it seems to the rational agent that certain aspects of their psychology func-
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tion to make it the case that they ought to φ. Rather, in general, it seems to the agent
who φs rationally that what makes it the case that they ought to φ are facts about the
way the world is which speak in favour of them φ-ing. Consider again the case of Cas-
sidy, who rationally intends to meet her friend for dinner because she promised to do so.
Were Cassidy to reflect on the question of why she ought to meet her friend for dinner,
that I promised to do so would be consideration that comes to mind but that I believe I
promised would not.
Of course, as was noted in §1.1 we sometimes treat aspects of our psychology as
speaking in favour of our performing certain actions or holding certain attitudes. I be-
lieve I’ve been abducted by aliens can perfectly well be treated by someone as making
it the case that they ought to request an appointment with a psychiatrist, for example.
In these sorts of cases it really is the fact that one believes something which the agent
treats as grounding the ought that applies to them, not what is believed. But notice that
even in these sorts of cases, it does not seem to the agent that they ought to φ because
their belief is part of what makes it the case that it would be incoherent for them not to
φ. That is to say: it doesn’t seem to the agent in these sorts of cases that the relevant
psychological states ground a structural ought that applies to them. Rather, it seems to
the agent even in these sorts of cases that the fact that they are in the relevant psycholo-
gical states functions to ground an ought in the same sort of way as facts about the world
function to ground such oughts – for example, the psychological fact seems to them to
ground yet more moral or prudential oughts. So the basic phenomenological objection
to Structuralism stands.26
Now let’s turn our attention to Subjectivism. According to Subjectivism, rationality
consists in φ-ing in a way that counts as a successful response to a subjective ought
that applies to one. The idea is that one has certain beliefs about the way the world is
which are such that (to a first approximation): were they true, one would have normative
reason to φ, and this suffices for one to be under a special kind of obligation to φ: one
subjectively ought to φ. φ-ing rationally is all about successfully comporting oneself to
these subjective oughts, by responding to what one believes about the situation.
Again, though, this ‘in response to’ relation is subject to the Perspectival Constraint.
That means the proponent of Subjectivism will have to say that whenever an agent φs ra-
tionally, the agent must be aware of items they believe, items which can be there whether
or not what they believe is true, and they must register these items as making it the case
that they subjectively ought to φ.
26Moreover, even if we could construct cases in which the agent really is responding to structural require-
ments, such cases would certainly not be the norm. And yet, the Perspectival Constraint implies that if
Structuralism is true, such cases would have to be the norm.
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The phenomenological objection to this picture should be obvious. For consider
what the deliberative life of the agent would be like if the considerations they believe did
appear to them as grounding subjective oughts during conscious reasoning about what
they should do or think. Suppose it appears to the agent as if the fact that p grounds an
objective ought for them to φ. If subjective oughts appeared from the point of view of
the agent it would also have to be the case that p appears to them not just as a fact but
also as a consideration they believe and as, in its guise as a thing believed, making it
the case that the agent subjectively ought to φ in addition to the objective ought which
appears to apply to them. This would mean that for any objective ought that appears
to the agent to apply to them, there would be a second ought of a different type which
appears to the agent to apply to them. I take it to be phenomenologically obvious that
this is not the way things are from the agent’s own point view.
So neither Structuralism nor Subjectivism are plausible theses: given the Perspectival
Constraint, both run straight into phenomenological problems. We can add that each
theory runs into a kind of ethical objection, too. Each thesis, given the Perspectival
Constraint, implies that the rational agent must φ in recognition of certain subjective
features of their situation: either certain of their psychological states qua grounding
structural requirements, or the items they believe qua grounding subjective oughts. But
since, from the point of view of the agent, there will also be plenty of moral, pruden-
tial, or epistemic oughts which apply to them, grounded in objective features of their
situation, to which they respond in cases of rationally φ-ing, Structuralism and Subject-
ivism have the rational agent as responding jointly to certain features of themselves and
to certain features of the world (although they will have it that only a response to the
former is what constitutes rationality, properly so-called).
But an agent who is doubly-motivated in this way is perverse. Imagine someone
who goes to visit their ailing relative both because it’s their relative, so that they have
moral reason to go, and because it would be incoherent for them not to go, given their
beliefs. Or consider an agent who sits down to play the piano both because they regard
mastering the relevant piece as intrinsically valuable and because they recognise that
were what they believe about their situation true they would have reason to sit and play,
so that they subjectively ought to sit and play. Such agents suffer from something akin,
although not exactly like, Williams’s (1976) one-thought-too-many syndrome. I take it
to be an obvious constraint on any successful theory of rationality that rational agents
as such don’t display this syndrome.
This concludes my argument. Before ending the paper with some reflections on
how the dialectic is affected by the possibility of a Disjunctive View of rationality, let
me summarise the argument so far. The debates over Psychologism and Factivism ap-
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pear to be merely verbal disputes: this I tried to show in §§1–2. But that’s puzzling:
presumably philosophers engaged in those debates are debating about something more
than just what phrases like ‘the reason’ and ‘S’s reason’ mean in motivating reason
ascriptions. There are substantive issues concerning the nature and normative structure
of rationality at least in the vicinity of these debates: this is what I tried to show in §3.
Those substantive issues are whether Structuralism, which I associate with Psycholo-
gism, and Subjectivism, which I associate with Anti-Factivism, are the correct theories
of rationality: two versions of the Anaemic View. In light of the Perspectival Constraint,
however, Structuralism and Subjecitvism are untenable for phenomenological grounds.
The upshot for Psychologism andAnti-Factivism is therefore that they can be saved from
the charge of being merely verbal thesis, but only at the expense of being committed to
false substantive ones.
4.3 Coda: Disjunctive Views of Rationality
I want to finish with a comment on how the availability of a Disjunctive View of ra-
tionality might have an impact on the argument of this paper. According to Disjunctive
Views of rationality: the agent φs rationally in both the good case and the case of fac-
tual error. But there is a difference between the two cases, rationality-wise: in the good
case, the agent’s φ-ing rationally consists in them successfully responding to an ob-
jective normative reason – whether a moral reason, a prudential reason, an epistemic
reason. . . ; in the case of factual error, it consists in them achieving a non-accidental fit
between their response and what appears to them to be objective normative reasons to
do so. Moreover, these two statuses of rationality are intimately related: successfully
responding to what appears to one to be an objective normative reason for one to φ is to
be understood, to a first approximation, as consisting in responding in a way that would
be a successful response to an objective normative reason, were one to know the relev-
ant facts. Because the bad kind of rationality is parasitic on the good kind in this way,
there’s no danger of the bad kind of rationality rendering the good kind of rationality
explanatorily redundant.
I am sympathetic to an account of rationality with the disjunctive character just
broached. What I want to do now, however, is describe a version of that disjunctive
picture, the availability of which appears to undermine the argument of this paper. I
will argue in turn, however, that the argument of the paper extends to this version of the
Disjunctive View. The upshot is that if we’re to opt for a Disjunctive View of rationality
at all, and in the end I think that we should,27 we shouldn’t opt for this particular version
27See Cunningham (2019a,b, Forthcoming, Unpublished Manuscript[a],[b])
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of it.
According to the version of the disjunctive view in question:
Subjective Ought Disjunctivism. In the good case, the agent φs rationally and this
consists in them successfully responding to an objective normative reason. In the
case of factual error the agent φs rationally and this consists in them successfully
responding to a subjective ought, grounded in what they believe about the situ-
ation. The latter condition is parasitic on the former condition in the following
way: What it is for the agent to be under a subjective ought is, to a first approxim-
ation, for what they believe to be such that were it true, it would be an objective
normative reason for them to φ.
This position is a form of Disjunctivism about rationality because it treats rationality
as constituted by different kinds of conditions across good cases and cases of factual
error, but treats the condition which constitutes rationality in the case of factual error as
parasitic on the condition which constitutes rationality in the good case. What marks
this kind of Disjunctivism out as a distinctive form of the view is the way it cashes out
rationality in the case of factual error and, correspondingly, how this is supposed to be
parasitic on rationality in the good case. According to Subjective Ought Disjunctivism,
the rationality of the agent’s φ-ing in the factual error case consists in them successfully
responding to a subjective ought, in the sense associated with the Subjectivist version
of the Anaemic View described above. And this condition of successfully responding
to a subjective ought is parasitic on the condition of responding to an objective ought in
the following way: subjective oughts just are oughts which would be objective oughts,
were the beliefs on which they’re grounded true.28
The availability of Subjective Ought Disjunctivism appears to undermine the ar-
gument of this paper at two crucial points.29 First, the phenomenological and ethical
arguments offered in §4.2 appear to fail to extend to Subjective Ought Disjunctivism.
After all, given the way the subjective ought is parasitic on the objective ought, there
isn’t an extra ought present in the good case which would be one ought too many, from
the ethical and phenomenological points of view. And second, isn’t Subjective Ought
Disjunctivism a position which is a form of Anti-Factivism about motivating reasons?
If so, since Subjective Ought Disjunctivism is a substantive view and one which, as per
28Of course, one could try to run a version of Disjunctivism which identifies rationality in error cases
with the successful response to a structural ought. But such a view is less natural because it’s difficult
to develop a satisfactory way of ensuring that successfully responding to a structural ought is parasitic
on successfully responding to an objective ought.
29I am thankful to my reviewer for drawing my attention to this.
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the first point, isn’t undermined by the arguments of §4.2, it turns out there is a version
of Anti-Factivism which is substantive and potentially true, after all.
In fact, however, I think the argument of the paper extends to Subjective Ought
Disjunctivism. Let me take the second concern first. It’s certainly true that Subjective
Ought Disjunctivism is consistent with the letter of Anti-Factivism. Anti-Factivism
says that S can φ for the reason that p even if not-p, where S’s reason is what they
believe instead of any psychological state they are in. This looks perfectly consistent
with the sort of disjunctive picture advertised above. It would just have to be that this
Anti-Factivist identifies φ- ing motivated by a reason with the rationality constituting
condition which is common to the good case and cases of factual error.
But it’s not clear to me that this sort of Anti-Factivism is a substantive position.
To see this, we should ask: What substantive claim is added to Subjective Ought Dis-
junctivism insofar as we combine it with the Anti-Factivist view that one φs for a reason
across good cases and cases of factual error? So far as I can tell, we just add the merely
linguistic thesis that we can call the kind of rationality constituting condition which is
common to each of these cases ‘φ-ing for a reason’. But this is not a philosophically
substantive thesis.
Now let me turn my attention to the worry that Subjective Ought Disjunctivism
avoids the phenomenological and ethical arguments of §4.2. Again, I doubt that the
view does avoid these arguments. Take the phenomenological datum that it does not
in general seem to the rational agent as if they respond to a subjective ought groun-
ded in what they believe. Given Normative Guidance and the Perspectival Constraint,
and assuming that the way things seem to rational agents isn’t systematically mislead-
ing, it follows that it is not in general true that the rational agent counts as successfully
responding to a subjective ought.
Now, the Subjective Ought Disjunctivist does want to say that when one φs ration-
ally in the factual error case, this consists in one’s successfully responding a subjective
ought. So, it appears that they will have to endorse Normative Guidance about the
rationality-constituting condition which is present in the case of factual error. But I’ve
already argued that the Perspectival Constraint is something any proponent of Normat-
ive Guidance will have to commit themselves to. So, the Subjective Ought Disjunctivist
will have to say that, in the case of factual error, the rational agent treats what they be-
lieve about their situation as grounding a subjective obligation to φ that they are under.
But the phenomenological datum holds of the case of factual error just as it does in the
good case: It doesn’t seem to the agent as if there is a subjective ought to which they
are responding.
The upshot is that, even if the danger posed by the phenomenological datum to the
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Subjective Ought Disjunctivist’s account of the good case can be mitigated, that datum
undermines the Subjective Ought Disjunctivist’s account of the factual error case any
way. Mutatis mutandis for the ethical datum that there is something objectionable about
responding to what one treats as grounding a subjective ought in addition to responding
to what one treats as grounding an objective ought.
Where does this leave us? What this means is that if we’re to endorse a theory
of rationality with a disjunctive character at all, then we should avoid one according
to which rationality-in-the-factual-error-case consists in successfully responding to any
kind of ought. We should drop Normative Guidance (and hence the Perspectival Con-
straint) from our account of that kind of rationality. And we should therefore say that
the only kind of rationality to which Normative Guidance (and hence the Perspectival
Constraint) applies is the good kind of rationality, which is also the most fundamental
kind of rationality. How we are to work out the details of this form of Disjunctivism is
a task I leave to future work.
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